the period. We now have histories of the Cold War that are theoretically innovative and empirically multidimensional. 3 This is an exciting time to research and write the history of the Cold War. With each passing year the flow of books, articles, and dissertations increases at a dizzying pace. Journals devoted, in part or entirely, to the period have proliferated: Cold War History, the Journal of Cold War Studies, Diplomatic History, The Sixties, Intelligence and National Security, the Journal of Transatlantic Studies, and the list goes on. Electronic discussion lists, from H-DIPLO to H-1960s, provide enough daily reading for all of a scholar's waking hours, with even a few minutes for some angry email missives to fellow list subscribers. Above all, huge reference works have emerged to cover all of the obvious historical topics -large and small -in exhaustive depth. The thick two-volume Encyclopedia of the Cold War, published by Routledge, and the even thicker three-volume Cambridge History of the Cold War provide well-researched and thorough accounts of the period. 4 Reading all of these materials, and keeping up with new arrivals, is an inhuman task. No one can claim that he or she knows all the scholarship on the Cold War. No one can claim unchallenged expertise on all major issues. The field of Cold War history now looks more like the historiography of the French Revolution, the American Civil War, or nazi Germany in its breadth, its fragmentation, and its unceasing scholarly proliferation.
That is the overwhelming challenge in the field: how to make sense of it all? In the deluge of new work, many scholars are swimming in an ocean of new sources and interpretations without anchors of insight for guidance and stability. The diversity and richness of the subject has become disorienting. How does one identify key historiographical markers? Or, as one of my graduate students recently asked me: 'How do we know where to start and where to stop our reading? There is just too much.' I did not show much sympathy for that student at the time, but she made an important point.
There are many potential rubrics one could employ to chart the ocean of new histories about the Cold War. None will match the stale demarcations of 'orthodox', 'revisionist', and 'post-revisionist'. These labels reflected the somewhat provincial and self-serving politics of the Cold War in the American academy, especially after the Vietnam War. If anything, these categories simplified sophisticated work and they distracted from the interesting and enduring research questions. 'Right' and 'Left' do not make much sense as historiographical labels, especially since most of the contemporary young historians writing in the field fit neither tradition in their methodologies or politics. All of the major new works on the Cold War examine elite leaders and ordinary citizens. All of them at least gesture to history 'from above' and history 'from below'. All of them also include attention to the 'hard' power of money and weapons, as well as the 'soft' power of ideas and culture.
Despite the claims of some, there are very few serious 'triumphal' histories of the United States in the Cold War. Similarly, there are very few serious 'condemning' histories of American policies. Most sophisticated works now fall somewhere in between. The unequivocal self-righteousness of George Kennan and William Appleman Williams has given way to the agonized, judicious, and ultimately qualified claims of Wilson Miscamble and Melvyn Leffler.
5 Leffler concludes his influential recent book by arguing that everyone was responsible for the Cold War, but no one acted unreasonably:
The Cold War lasted as long as it did because of the ways in which American and Soviet ideas intersected with evolving conditions of the international system. U.S. and Soviet leaders thought they represented superior ways of organizing human existence . . . These contradictory visions of mankind's future were inseparable from Soviet and American ideas about the past.
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This is a sensible and balanced conclusion, but it leaves a lot unanswered about the interplay of ideas and circumstances across five decades of international history. Some of the most interesting and revealing debates among historians working with new evidence focus on the complex relations between societies, and the changing nature of their interactions. Was the period characterized by more conflict or co-operation? How did forms of conflict and co-operation coexist at the same time? When did one dominant mode of political behavior replace another? In this context, the basic nature of the Cold War is under investigation, and historians have shown how even the most elemental characteristics of the period were dynamic, contingent, and even uncertain at times. There were, therefore, many Cold Wars wrapped within the 'evolving conditions' cited by Leffler.
The essays in this special issue begin from this point of departure. Drawing on newly available archival materials from multiple societies, and a sophisticated reading of these materials in the light of prior scholarship, each of the 5 George F. Kennan, American Diplomacy, 1900 -1950 (Chicago, IL 1951 authors examines ideas, decisions, and events that show the complex interplay of conflict and co-operation at many levels -redefining nationalism and 'civilization' after the second world war, re-educating German citizens, reconstituting Great Power stability in the Near East, rebuilding post-Occupation Japan, reinvigorating human rights in Latin America, and, perhaps most extraordinary, rethinking nuclear weapons on the edge of Armageddon. The essays are focused in their cases, but broad in their interpretive implications. They re-define the Cold War and they re-define the international history of the period. Most of all, they capture the most fundamental element of contemporary history -the enduring influence of decisions made at one moment for those living years and decades later. The past is also part of the present in these wellresearched articles.
In each case, the authors narrate efforts by leaders and citizens to create something in between conflict and co-operation: something more than traditional national sovereignty, but less than empire. We might call this the dilemma of Great Power politics in an era of democratized citizenries. State leaders from Josef Stalin to Leonid Brezhnev felt a strong need to exert power across distant geographies, and they did this through centralized, sometimes repressive, rule. Citizens and less powerful state actors, from postwar emigres to human rights activists, felt emboldened to assert themselves, and demand independence, protection, and consumption in unprecedented quantities. In each of these essays, leaders and citizens struggle with this contradiction between great power and democratic demands, the desire for authority without the costs of control. In each of these essays, this contradiction contributes to conflict and co-operation, and different efforts at managing their relationship. The key point is that policies on postwar nationalism, German re-education, the Near East, post-Occupation Japan, Latin America, and arms control were not pre-determined in any of the major societies. They emerged from uncertain negotiations, circumstantial responses to pressures, and unplanned decisions. The Cold War, according to our authors, was made and remade in various moments.
As a whole, these essays complicate our understanding of power and ideology in the Cold War, and they force us to think beyond traditional categories and formulate new ones. These are not articles about programs for power in the Cold War, but instead the complicated and contingent processes of managing allies and adversaries (as well as citizens and critics) in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. These essays are striking in their originality, their depth of research, and their breadth of interpretation. They do not cohere with one single conclusion, but that is their strength. They capture contingency and complexity -the key elements of a relevant and useful contemporary history.
The publication of these essays adds more water to the deluge of Cold War scholarship. That is an unavoidable fact. These essays will not make order out of the sometime chaos of the field. That is not something they endeavor to accomplish. Instead, what we have in the evidence, analysis, and interpretation of these Cold War moments are a series of case studies that shed light on the
